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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court erred by failing to

grant defendant's motion to suppress evidence*

v

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
Case No. 19772

DANNY DUANE BUCK,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against Danny Duane
Buck for two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value in a trial heard
by the bench.

He was found guilty and was sentenced on January

20, 1984, in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge, presiding,
Statement of Facts
On April 19, 1983, Officer Steven Brown of Metropolitan
Narcotics Stike Force, presented certain information to Deputy
Salt Lake County Attorney McKelvie, who prepared an Affidavit
for Search Warrant.

The affidavit contained a request that the

officer(s) executing the requested warrant not be required to
give notice of the officer's authority or purpose (knock and
announce), on the ground that Officer Brown believed that the
marijuana and amphetamines thought to be in defendant Danny
Buck's residence would be easily destroyed.

Brown signed the

affidavit before Circuit Court Judge Eleanor Lewis.

Judge Lewis

then issued the search warrant, but did not authorize the officer
to dispense with notice of authority and purpose in executing
the warrant.
The record is unclear as to whether Officer Brown read
the warrant after it was issued by Judge Lewis. At the preliminary hearing held on May 18, 1983, he testified that he had read
it.

He then later testified on July 1, 1983 that he had read

it, but had not seen that the no-knock authorization had not
been checked and believed that the warrant was a no-knock warrant
(Motion to Suppress Transcript,

p.100).

He then testified on

December 6, 1983, that he did not remember reading it after it
was signed by Judge Lewis (Trial Transcript,

p.39).

Thereafter, on April 19, 198 3, Officer Brown, along with
other Metro officers, all in plain clothes, proceeded to Mr.
Buck's residence at approximately 5:00 p.m. to execute the search
warrant.

The officers, all bearing visible firearms, spread out

on both sides of the residence.

Officer Brown, without giving

notice of purpose and authority and without attempting to open
the door of the residence, kicked it in.

Other officers entered

through the back of the house by kicking in the back door.
Officer Brown, then inside, began shouting "police officers"
over and over until all of the officers were inside and they
Hereafter Motion to Suppress Transcript will be referred
to as SuT and Trial Transcript as TrT.

-2-

had checked to see that no one was inside the house.

The sub-

sequent search of the house uncovered quantities of marijuana
and amphetamines.
At approximately 5:15 p.m., Danny Buck returned to his
home and was placed under arrest.

He was later charged with two

counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute for value.
The preliminary hearing was held on this matter on May 18,
198 3, before Judge Eleanor Lewis, at which time the matter was
bound over for arraignment.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress

the evidence, which hearing on this motion was held on July 1,
1983, before Judge Homer F. Wilkinson.

No ruling was made at

this time. At trial, on December 6, 1983, a motion to suppress
the evidence was again made by the defendant.
denied.

That motion was

Defendant was found guilty. •
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant Danny Duane Buck contends he was denied a

fair trial when the court failed to grant the motion to suppress
evidence.

He contends that because the search of April 19, 1983

was conducted in violation of the terms of the search warrant
itself and in violation of Utah law, it constituted an unreasonable search, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

-3-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT, ON ITS FACE,
INDICATES THAT JUDGE LEWIS DECIDED
THAT THE PRESENCE OF NARCOTICS WAS
NOT BY ITSELF AN EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE
AND ACCORDINGLY, SHE DID NOT AUTHORIZE
A NO-KNOCK WARRANT,
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 provides that:
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building,
room, conveyance, compartment or other
enclosure, the officer executing the
warrant may use such force as is reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) If, after notice of his authority
and purpose, there is no response or he
is not admitted with reasonable promptness; or
(2) Without notice of his authority and
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the
warrant directs in the warrant that the
officer need not give notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof,
under oath, that the object of the search
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of,
or secreted, or that physical harm may
result to any person if notice were given.
The most important aspect of the above statute is that
a magistrate's

neutral decision to dispense with notice is

required before the officer can enter without notice.

It has been

recognized that a "householder is entitled to the assurance that
the magistrate has considered and decided whether the facts
justify" a particular kind of search.
P.2d 96 (New Mexico 1969).

State v. Dalrymple, 458

Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court

recognized the importance of this neutral judgment in State v.
Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974), where it upheld the constitutionality of the above statute because it provided for the

-4-

objective inquiry by the magistrate as to the necessity of
notice.
Therefore, becasue this neutral judgment is so very
important to the constitutionality of the statute, it follows
that the police are bound to follow it, as set forth in the
warrant.

They are not allowed to exercise their own judgment

on the same set of facts, and substitute it for the judgment of
the magistrate.

Thus, where Judge Lewis decided, pursuant to

this law, that the presence of narcotics in Mr. Buck's residence
did not justify issuing a no-knock warrant, the officers could
not legally decide otherwise and proceed without knocking in
contravention of Judge Lewis' directive.
The State relies on the holding in Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 10 L.Ed. 2d 726 (1963), where the United States
Supreme Court upheld the warrantless entry of a residence without
notice and held that "in the particular circumstances of this case
the officers method of entry, sanctioned by the law of California,
was not unreasonable under the standards of the Fourth Amendment
as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment," at
28.

Obviously, this holding is narrow and the state's reliance

on it is misplaced for two reasons.
First of all, the Court in Ker upheld police conduct that
was legal and routine under the state's laws.

California law

allowed the police to decide, in all narcotics cases, whether
notice was required before entering a residence; the law vested
total discretion in the officer.
-5-

However, that same conduct is

illegal under Utah law, as the above statute requires that the
magistrate make the determination that the presence of narcotics
in the defendant's residence justifies a no-knock warrant.

Thus,

the Ker reasoning cannot apply where Utah law is so different.
Also, the circumstances in Ker were different.

There

were "exigent circumstances" justifying an exception to the knock
and announce rule, i.e., the evidence showed that the defendant
expected the police to arrive and when they did, he made "furtive
movements" justifying the police's belief that he might have
been trying to destroy the narcotics.
Nothing like that happened in the case at bar.

If, when

the police arrived at Mr. Buck's home, they had heard scuffling
inside or perhaps the flushing of a toilet, they would have been
justified, under Ker and Utah law, in entering without notice
but only because of these circumstances, not solely because they
knew of the presence of drugs inside.

That issue—whether the

presence of drugs by itself justified entry without notice—had
already been decided by Judge Lewis in the negative.

She there-

fore did not give Officer Brown a no-knock warrant.
. Therefore, the police were bound to follow the order in
the warrant and could only have lawfully entered without notice
if, when they arrived at Danny Buck's residence, circumstances
then existed that would lead them to believe that Danny Buck
was going to destroy the evidence.
have been reasonable.

Furthermore, the belief must

It must be more than "the mere suspicion,

intution or 'hunch' of an enforcement officer, upon which a
-6-

reasonable man could conclude that closed doors are harboring
clandestine efforts to destroy or conceal evidence."

State v.

Mendoza, 454 P.2d 140 (Arizona 1969), quoting United States v.
Blank, 251 F.Supp. 166 (D.C. 1970).

In Mendoza, a no-knock

entry was not justified where there was nothing to indicate to
the officers that the narcotics sought would have been destroyed
if the officers had announced their presence and purpose.
Such was the situation in the case at bar.

There was

nothing to indicate to the officers upon their arrival at Danny
Buck's residence that he was inside trying to destroy the evidence.
Thusf because the presence of narcotics, by itself, was
not an exigent circumstance justifying entry without notice, as
found by Judge Lewis in her authorization of the warrant, and,
because no additional exigent circumstances existed at Mr. Buck's
residence to lead the officers to believe that the evidence was
being destroyed, there was absolutely nothing to justify the
forceful, unannounced entry into Mr. Buck's residence.

It

was therefore illegal, and the evidence obtained thereby should
have been suppressed.
POINT II
THE LEGAL STANDARDS DEVELOPED UNDER
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION SUPPORT THE
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE IN THE CASE
AT BAR.
A.

THE PROTECTION AFFORDED BY
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

-7-

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America provides that:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, a particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
The adoption of the Fourth Amendment reflected the feeling
of the Founding Fathers that "the security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . .
free society."
(1949).

is basic to a

Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25, 28, 93 L.Ed. 1782

The Fourth Amendement protects the citizen from the

ungoverned discretion of police officers by generally requiring
a probable cause determination by a magistrate before a search
can be conducted.

It requires that "the deliberate, impartial

judgment" of this magistrate be "interposed" between law enforcement desires and basic liberty interest of the citizen.

Wong Sun

v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481, 9 L.Ed. 2d 441 (1963).

In

doing so, the Fourth Amendment further "denies law enforcement
the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence."

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 92

L.Ed. 436 (1948) .
Germane to the magistrate's role as a neutral shield
between the citizen and police is the search warrant.

As the

primary instrument of the magistrate in fulfilling this goal,
the warrant "is a more reliable safeguard against improper
-8-

searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer."
Id. at 14.
As the search warrant is a preferred

weapon for protect-

ing Fourth Amendment rights, it is of utmost importance that the
courts remember that the "mandate of the Fourth Amendment requires
adherence to judicial process," United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S.
48, 51, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951), and that it "confines the officer
executing a search warrant strictly within the bounds set by
the warrant."

Bivens v. Six Unknonwn Named Agents, 403 U.S.

388, 394 ftnt 7, 29 L.Ed. 2d 619 (1971).

The courts must require

adherence to the warrants commands and limitations in order to
protect Fourth Amendment rights, lest they not be "revocable at
the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement
itself, chooses to suspend [their] enjoyment."

Mapp v. Ohio, 367

U.S. 643, 660 6 L.Ed. 2d 108 (1961).
Indeed, it was the abuse of the warrant in common law
England which eventually led to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in the United States, which, "together with legislation regulating the process, should be liberally construed in favor of the
individual."

Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210, 77 L.Ed.

260 (1932) .

Thus, especially where Fourth Amendment protections

are implemented by statutory law as well as by the specific
directive in a search warrant, the courts should always require
compliance with the law and the bounds set by the warrant.

To

permit the executing officer to exceed those bounds would eviscerate the Fourth Amendment's requirement of authorization "by a
-9-

warrant issued by a neutral judicial officer."

Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347, 354, 19 L.Ed. 2d 576 (1967).

Then the

requirement of a warrant would be reduced to a meaningless formality and Fourth Amendment protections reduced to nullity.
B.

THE POLICY REASONS BEHIND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT'S KNOCK AND
ANNOUNCE RULE WERE VIOLATED BY
THE UNANNOUNCED POLICE ENTRY
IN THIS CASE.

The policy reason's behind the Knock and Announce Rule
were discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23, 10 L.Ed. 2d 726 (1963).

They are to

protect the citizen in the peaceful security of his home and to
protect those who might be injured if violence occurs due to
unannounced entries.
The officers in this situation entered the defendant's
home without knocking or announcing their presence when they
had no knowledge as to whether anyone was inside.
violated the purposes behind the rule.

This conduct

It is irrelevant that

no one was inside, because the officers did not know that.

Hind-

sight cannot now be used to justify actions which could just as
easily violated the security of defendant's home and more
importantly, instigated violent resistance to the forced entry.
The practicality of this latter concern is evident, "for
if no previous demand is made, how is it possible for a party to
know what the object of the person breaking down the door may
be?

He has a right to consider it as an aggression on his private

property, which he will be justified in resisting to the utmost."
-10-

Launock v. Brown, 2 B & Aid. 592, 594, 106 Eng.Rep. 482, 483
(1819).

The potential for this very sort of violent response

existed here, especially where the police were not in uniform
and surrounded the house, all bearing visible firearms (TrT.
p.42).

Furthermore, Officer Brown just kicked the door in with-

out even first checking to see if it would open on its own (TrT.
p. 43), thereby damaging defendant's property without knowing the
necessity thereof. It was only then that the officers, guns
drawn, ran through the house, repeatedly shouting "police" (TrT.
p.44).

By then, it is likely that any citizen would have already

suffered the shock and fear of having his home surrounded by
plainly-clothed men with guns, one of whom willfully damages his
property.

At this point, any normal citizen might have been

induced to respond violently.

This is exactly the kind of situ-

ation which has been repeatedly condemned since the "knock and
announce" rule had its origins in common law England.

And

although no violence was done here, to support the actions of
these police officers could encourage such behavior in the future,
increasing the probability for violence.
Moreover, the conduct of the police officers in this
instance did not fall within the "exigent circumstances" exception
to the knock and announce rule, discussed in Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963) . In K_er, the police were not required to
knock and announce their presence where the evidence showed that
the defendant was expecting the police and knew of their purpose.

-11-

More importantly, the defendant's furtive movements inside the
house justified the officer's belief that he might have been
trying to destroy the evidence—a factor which the court recognized as excusing compliance with the rule.

In the case at bar,

Officer Brown had no reason to think that the defendant was
trying to escape or destroy evidence.
any furtive movement inside.

He did not see or hear

Therefore, he had no reason to

kick in the door and his action in doing so was not only needlessly aggressive, but illegal.
C.

THE RECENT DECISIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S POSITION.

In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
104 S.Ct.

82 L.Ed. 2d 677,

(1984) , the United States Supreme Court held that

evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a
search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, but utlimately
found to be without probable cause, was not to be suppressed.
In doing so, the Court effectively created a good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule where the police activity in question
was objectively reasonable, i.e., there, where the officer asked
pursuant

to the terms of a warrant that he thought was lawful and

valid.
The Court based its decision largely on the purpose of the
exclusionary rule defined as, "a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterent effect," Id.

at 687, quoting United States v.Calandra, 414

U.S. 338 (1974) at 348.

It then reviewed many of its exclusionary
-12-

rule decisions, reflecting the concern that the rule should not
always be applied to Fourth Amendment violations, especially
where the deterrence of unlawful police conduct would not be
accomplished.
Turning to the facts before it, the Court reasoned that
because police cannot be expected to question the magistrate^
probable cause determination or judgment that the form of the
warrant is legally sufficient, to exclude evidence because the
officer accepted such mistaken judgment but made no error on his
own, would not, "logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth
Amendment violations."

Id., at 697. The Court noted that the

deterrence goal would especially not be fulfilled when an officer
has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and
"acted within its scope."

Id., at 697.

It rejected the argument

that suppression will encourage officers to scrutinze warrants for
technical errors, still expressly assuming that the officers
properly executed the warrant.
As the Court's decision creating this good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule turns on the officers compliance with
the warrants directives, the exception is clearly inapplicable
to the present case.

Here the officer either read and ignored,

or did not read the warrant, and went ahead to execute it improperly exceeding the authorization contained therein and violating
the Utah no-knock statute.
Furthermore, because the officers1 activities exceeded
the scope of the warrant and violated the State statute, the
-13-

deterrence factor is very strong here.

Application of the

exclusionary rule would undoubtedly result in a change of undesirable police behavior; most officers hereforth will read
the warrants under which they act and will be certain of the
limitations imposed upon them.

The purpose of the warrant is

to limit the police discretion.

To allow the evidence seized

to be admitted would not only undermine the purpose of the
Utah statute, but would encourage police violations such as
this, rendering the warrant requirement meaningless.
Therefore, under the reasoning set forth in United States
v. Leon, the evidence seized by police acting outside the scope
of the warrant should be suppressed*
This conclusion is further supported by the Supreme
Court's decision in Massachusetts v* Sheppard,468 U.S.

, 82

L.Ed. 2d 737 (1984) , which applied the standards set forth in the
Leon case.
There, a police officer requested a particular search
warrant.

Upon delivery of the warrant, the judge assured the

officer that the warrant authorized the requested search.

It

was later discovered that the judge had not issued the warrant
in the proper form.

A motion to suppress evidence obtained

thereunder was denied.

The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding

that the officers belief in the warrants validity rested on the
judge's assurance and was, therefore, objectively reasonable and
in good faith.

Id.

at 744.

The Court based its decision on the objective belief
-14-

standard set forth in the Leon case in ruling that an officer
is not required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him
that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the
search he has requested.

The Court also noted that it was the

judge, not the officer who committed the error, suggesting the
inappropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule in such a
situation.

Id., at 745.

The case at bar is clearly distinguishable from the
situation in Sheppard.

Judge Lewis made no assurances to

Officer Brown regarding his request for a no-knock warrant.

She

did not verbally authorize it, nor did her conduct suggest that
she intended to authorize it.

Therefore, there was nothing for

him to reasonably and in good faith rely on outside of the express
terms of the warrant itself.
This is not a situation where the exclusionary rule would
be applied to punish the error of a judge.

The Judge did not err.

Further, to apply the exclusionary rule in this case would not
be a signal to police officers to question whether a magistrate
has in fact authorized a particular search—it would be a signal
to police officers that knowledge of and compliance with the terms
of a search warrant is required by the Fourth Amendment.
POINT III
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-12,
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED, AS THE FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
INVOLVED IN THIS CASE WAS BOTH SUBSTANTIAL AND NOT IN GOOD FAITH.
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) provides, in part, that:
-15-

(1) In any motion concerning the admissibility of evidence or the suppression
of evidence pursuant to this section or
at trial, upon grounds of unlawful search
and seizure, the suppression of evidence
shall not be granted unless the court
finds the violation upon which it is
based to be both a substantial violation
and not committed in good faith. The
court shall set forth its reasons for
such finding.
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall
in all cases be deemed substantial if
one or more of the following is established by the defendant or applicant by a
preponderance of the evidence:
(i) The violation was grossly negligent , willful, malicious, shocking to
to the conscience of the court or was
a result of the practice of the law
enforcement agency pursuant to a
general order of that agency;
(ii) The violation was intended only
to harass without legitmate law enforcement purposes.
Subsection 2 sets forth two situations in which the violation will always be considered substantial.

Defendant contends

that the violation here was the result of at least gross negligence
on the part of the officer in failing to read, or, disregarding
the terms of the search warrant.

There is no

better example

of gross negligence than failing to obey a duty imposed by law,
where the person owing the duty is a public officer and the duty
involves the public peace.

Furthermore, not only did the officer

fail to obey the lawful order of a court of law, but in doing so
he also violated a State statute.
Even were the court to rule that the officer's failure
to obey the warrant was not grossly negligent and thus substantial
under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (2), the court may still find
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that the violation was substantial for other reasons. The
instances of substantiality listed under Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12
(g)(2) are not exclusive.

Indeed, other jurisdictions have

found similar actions of police officers to constitute substantial Fourth Amendment violations and have applied the
exclusionary rule accordingly.
In State v. Dalrymple, 458 P.2d 96 (New Mexico 1969), the
Court of Appeals of New Mexico reversed the defendant's conviction,
holding that where nighttime searches were not authorized by
appropriate direction on the warrants, the searches executed under
the warrants were unreasonable and illegal and that evidence
seized thereunder should have been suppressed.
There the state statute provided that night searches
could only be conducted where the magistrate determined the
necessity thereof and authorized such on the warrant itself,
similar to the Utah no-knock statute.

The court rejected the

state's argument that because the affidavits upon which the
warrants were issed were sufficient to authorize a search anytime, the police had substantially complied with the statute,
stating that, "[T]he difficulty with this argument is that it
ignores the plain requirement of the statute that the issuing
magistrate or judge shall make an affirmative determination as
to whether the warrant may be executed other than in the daytime."
Id. at 98. The court emphasized the mandatory nature of the
statute (as opposed to the validity of the warrant itself),
suggesting that a violation of it would be substantial.
-17-

The situation is the same in the present case.

The

circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant may have
justified a no-knock search, but that determination was not
made by Judge Lewis as required by the Utah statute.

The Court

cannot ignore the plain requirment of the statute, especially
where the Court has held that it is this requirement (the neutral
determination of a magistrate) which makes the Utah no-knock
statute constitutional.
1974).

State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah

Therefore, the violation of such a significant require-

ment alone is substantial.

So, too, is the attendant violation

of the court order given pursuant to that requirement.
In another case, Wilkins v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1116 (Ark.
1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized the substantiality
of such a violation, holding that suppression was proper where
a nighttime search was not authorized on the warrant.

The court

stated that the "search was in clear contravention to the directive of the issuing magistrate, and consequently, all of the
property seized thereunder must be suppressed."

3jd. at 117.

Also, in State v. Thompson, 464 A.2d 799 (Conn. 1983),
the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of conspiracy
to possess and distrubute narcotics charges on the grounds that
the police had violated the minimization requirement of the
Connecticut wiretap statute and the court order which had been
issued purusant to that staute. As officers

had misconstrued

the scope of the order which authorized the wiretap and then disregarded it, the court stated that therefore, "the otherwise
valid warrant [became] a general one in which case the fruits of
-18-

the search must be suppressed."

Id., at 813.

In response to

the state's argument that only the evidence obtained as a
result of the minimization requirement should be suppressed,
the Court answered that had the officers at least attempted to
comply with the statute and the warrant issued thereunder, that
might be proper, but that it should uphold "total suppression
when the violation results from complete disregard of the minimization requirement." Id. at 812. This was so because "[t]o
permit the executing officer to exceed those bounds would
eviscerate the Fourth Amendment's requirements that electronic
surveillance be authorized by a warrant issued by a neutral
judicial officer."

Id. at 810, quoting Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967) .
The court's main concern was to ensure the integrity
of the statute and the judiciary function with respect to it.
Similarly, to allow the officers actions in the case at bar to
stand would impair the integrity of the Utah no-knock statute,
especially where, as noted before, the judicial determination
requirement saves the statute from constitutional infirmity.
Such a ruling would render the judge's duties under the statute
meaningless.

Based on the foregoing, the Court should thus rule

that the police conduct in the present case constituted a substantial Fourth Amendment violation.
Utah law then provides that if the defendant establishes
that the search or seizure was unlawful and substantial by a
preponderance of the evidence, the peace officer must then,
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by a preponderance of the evidence, prove the good faith actions
of the police officer.

Pursuant to the standards set forth in

the recent United States Supreme Court decisions, United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S.
Sheppard, 468 U.S.

, 82 LEd. 2d 677 (1984) and Massachusetts v.
, 82 L.Ed. 2d 737 (1984), other principles

of law, and the factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (3),
the officers actions in the present case were not in good faith.
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (3) provides, in part, that:
In determining whether a peace officer
was acting in good faith under this
section, the court shall consider, in
addition to any other relevant factors,
some or all of the following:
(i) The extent of deviation from
legal search and seizure standards;
(ii) The extent to which exclusion
will tend to deter future violations
of search and seizure standards;
(iii) Whether or not the officer was
proceeding by way of a search warrant,
arrest warrctnt, or relying on previous specific directions of a magistrate or prosecutor. . .
The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Leon,
468 U.S.

, 82 L.Ed. 2d 677 (1984) and Massachusetts v.

Sheppard, 468 U.S.

, 82 L.Ed. 2d 737 (1984), effectively

carved out a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. As
discussed previously in this brief at page 14, Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, applying the principles set forth United States v. Leon,
held that where an officer acts in reasonable reliance on a
magistrate's express assurance that the search warrant authorizes
the search requested by the officer, evidence obtained in reliance
on that assurance will not be suppressed.
-20-

The Court concluded

that the officers actions were in good faith where the officer's
belief in the authority of the warrant rested on the judge's
assurance, reasoning that an officer should not be required to
disbelieve a judge who tells him that the warrant authorizes
the requested search.
The situation in the present case is not the same. Here,
the officer was given no assurances.

There was nothing for him

to, in good faith, rely upon except the express terms of the
warrant itself, which he did not follow.

Judge Lewis never

verbally authorized the requested search and never assured the
officer that she was going to authorize the requested search.
Therefore, his belief in the warrants authority was not objectively
reasonable and in good faith as defined by the Supreme Court in
Sheppard.
Furthermore, the facts set forth by the Utah Legislature
in Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (3) support a finding that the
officers were not acting in good faith.
(i)

The extent of deviation from legal
search and seizure standards.

As mentioned and cited before, other states have ruled
on the issue of whether officers acting outside the limitations
set forth in a warrant are in violation of legal search and
seizure standards. Most states have held that they are.

See

State v. Dalrymple, 458 P.2d 96 (1969) (officers nighttime execution of a warrant that did not contain the nighttime search authorization was held to be illegal and thus, the evidence seized
under the warrant was suppressed); State v. Wilson, 540 P.2d 1269
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(Arizona 1975)(nighttime search was illegal where it had not
been authorized in the warrant); Wilkens v. State, 547 S.W.2d
1116 (Arkansas 1977) (nighttime search was illegcil where it was
not authorized in the warrant); State v. Thompson, 464 A.2d 799
(Conn. 1983)(wiretap was illegal where it exceeded the minimization limitations set forth in the court order).
(ii)

The extent to which exclusion
will tend to deter future
violations of search and
seizure standards.

The strength of the deterrence factor in a situation
where officers acted outside the scope of a wiretap warrant was
recognized by the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Thompson,
supra, where the court noted that one of the reasons for upholding the suppression of evidence there was to recognize "the need
for any effective deterrent to unlawful conduct of wiretaps/1
464 A.2d at 812.
In that kind of situation, similar to the case at bar,
a neutral judge or magistrate has examined the facts and set
forth specific commands and limitations in a search warrant.
The executing officer then oversteps the limitations contained
in the warrant, so the violation results from his error.

In

this situation, the suppression of evidence effects the source
of the Fourth Amendment violation and is therefore a more
effective deterrent.
Likewise, as noted by the United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Leon, supra, suppression will not have any
deterrent effect on police behavior in cases where the officer
-22-

reasonably relied on a magistrate's determination which later
turns out to be wrong. 82 L.Ed, 2d at 697. The court noted that
the deterrence goal would especially not be fulfilled where the
officer has obtained a search warrant and "acted within its
scope."

Id, Again, the logical correllary to this is that

suppression will have a deterrent effect where the officer has
not acted within the scope of the warrant—where it is the officer
and not the judge who has erred.
Such is the case here. At the very least, suppression
of evidence obtained in violation of a warrant's limitations
will encourage officers to read, ascertain, and follow the
directives in the warrant.
(iii) Whether or not the officer was
proceeding by way of a search
warrant, arrest warrant, or
relying on the previous specific
directions of a magistrate or
prosecutor.
Consideration of this factor supports defendant's conten- tion that the officer was not acting in good faith.

Here, the

officer was not proceeding by way of a search warrant, because
he proceeded beyond the way of such warrant.

Nor was he relying

on the previous directions of a magistrate when in fact he failed
to obey those directions.

Because of this, the State cannot now

rely on the fact that a warrant was issued.
In State v. Merjil, 655 P.2d 864 (Hawaii 1982), the
Hawaii Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction where
the magistrate's order, which allowed a body cavity search to be
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given only if an X-ray was given first and revealed the presence
of foreign matter in the body, was not followed.

The Court

held that "where the warrant sets out a procedure by which to
conduct the search, the government must reasonably adhere to
that procedure.

The procedure was not followed here, so the

government may not rely on the court order to justify the search."
Id. at 865. The court recognized the uselessness of allowing
the government to argue that the actions of its officers were
in good faith, simply because the officers had obtained a warrant,
in situations where the officers acted in excess of the authority
contained in the warrant.

To allow the officers to stand behind

a warrant which they did not follow would be to make a mockery of
the warrant requirement.

In the case at bar, the court should not

allow the State to assert that the existance of the warrant itself
indicates good faith on the part of the officers.

The fact that

it was not adhered to indicates a lack of good faith.
Therefore, the officers in the case at bar were not acting
in good faith, as defined by the United States Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, supra, and considering the factors set
forth in Utah Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g) (3).

Consequently, the

motion to suppress should have been granted pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-12 (g).
POINT IV
THE STATES ARGUMENT THAT BECAUSE, AFTER
THE OFFICERS HAD KNOCKED AND GOTTEN NO
RESPONSE, THEIR ENTRY WOULD HAVE BEEN
LAWFUL UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. §77-23-10;
THAT IT WAS LAWFUL HERE WHEN THEY DID
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NOT KNOCK, IGNORES THE PURPOSE AND
PLAIN MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§77-23-10.
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10 provides that:
When a search warrant has been issued
authorizing entry into any building,
room, conveyance, compartment, or
other enclosure, the officer executing
the warrant may use such force as is
reasonably necessary to enter:
(1) If, after notice of his authority
and purpose, there is no response or
he is not admitted with reasonable
promptness; or
(2) Without notice of his authority
and purpose, if the magistrate issuing
the warrant directs in the warrant that
the officer need not give notice. The
magistrate shall so direct only upon
proof, under oath, that the object of
the search may be quickly destroyed,
disposed of, or secreted, or that
physical harm may result to any person
if notice were given.
The above statute sets out the only two, separate situations in which an officer may use forces to enter a dwelling.
He may forcefully enter a building when there is no response from
within—only if he has given notice first.

Or, he may force-

fully enter without notice where the warrant authorizes him
to do so.

These are separate statutory sections and the plain

meaning of them is that the officer may act under one or the other.
In the present case, the officer did not knock first, justifying
a forced entry under

subsection (1). Also, the warrant did not

authorize a surprise, forced entry under subsection (2). Therefore the forced entry was not made in compliance with the statue
and was thus, illegal.
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The officers are responsible for following the required
procedures on execution of any search warrant.

A simple reading

of the warrant would have revealed lack of permission to enter
as they did.

Even if that reading

had been done after leaving

.the magistrate and still before entry, officers certainly could
have recontacted the judge by telephone for clarification.

If

the judge chose to allow "no-knock" entry a new correct search
warrant could have been drafted by telephone as provided by
Utah statute with very little lost by the officers.

Certainly

a small amount of double checking the work and correcting of
mistakes is not too much to require before invading the most
intimate privacy of a citizen's home.
The State seeks to apply a hindsight constriction,
mixing and matching the words of the separate statutory sections
in order to justify illegal police conduct.

This argument has

no place in this discussion, where the issue is simply that the
police did not obey this law.

Under no convoluted construction

can it be said that they did what this statute plainly requires.
The statute clearly sets up a code of conduct to be
followed by police officers.

The court should support the legis-

lative determination of how its officers should conduct themselves
in searches.

To accept the States ever-present and tedious "no

harm done" argument suggests that the State can break the law in
its superior position as crime fighter.

This kind of thinking

threatens the integrity of laws enacted to protect the individual,
laws such as this which provide for neutral judgment to be
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interposed between police discretion and the citizen's liberty.
This Court in State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561 (Utah 1974),
recognized the constitutional importance of the requirement of
subsection (2) (that a magistrate determine whether the facts
justify a no-knock warrant), which gives the statute and the
orders issued under it their validity.

It would be analogous

for the court to now allow conduct which circumvents this
important safeguard to stand.

Again, the statute's mandate was

not followed, under either section.
the law.

The State's argument ignores

In order to maintain the respect and integrity of the

law, the State's argument should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
Put very simply, a search warrant was issued by an
independent magistrate.

No permission was given by the magis-

trate to the police to enter the premises without knocking.
The police totally ignored the issue of whether or not they
had such permission even though getting such permission is one
of the few specific requirements of the law in Utah regarding
search warrants.

Such disregard for procedure is a gross devia-

tion from the law on search warrants.

The only remedy is suppres-

sion of evidence gained by illegal means.

The trial court erred

when it should have suppressed the evidence seized and did not.
Defendant/appellant respectfully requests that this Court rule
now to correct that error.
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